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Abstract 
This chapter argues that gender is endogenous to the economic process. It demonstrates a two-
way relationship between the economy and gender relations, and emphasizes the macro level. It 
demonstrates that inequality in gender relations can have a negative effect on economic policy 
and economic outcomes. This integrated understanding of gender in economics, developed in 
feminist economics, is not possible in neoclassical economics because that treats gender, like any 
social structure, as exogenous, often as a given constraint on individual choices, or at most as a 
sex-disaggregated impact variable. Heterodox economics, in particular when applying a 
contextual view of the economy as embedded in social, cultural, and political structures, allows 
for an endogenous analysis of gender. This chapter shows, with examples from empirical 
research, how this may be done in a systematic way, by linking feminist economic insights with 
various key heterodox concepts. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In neoclassical macroeconomics, gender is often completely absent, either as a variable, or as 
driving certain institutions, or as underlying the gender division of labour between the paid and 
unpaid economy. At the same time, the unpaid economy is often completely ignored. At most, 
gender is included as exogenous through a sex disaggregated variable such as male and female 
labour force participation. For example, in various analyses on EU economic growth in relation to 
an increasing dependency ratio due to the aging population, the relatively low female labour force 
participation rate has been identified as a constraint on economic growth and financial 
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sustainability of pension systems. Alternatively, some macroeconomic analyses may point at 
unequal impacts of macroeconomic phenomena on men and women, for example studies that 
have shown that cheap labour export strategies of developing countries have generated more 
employment for women as compared to men, because the kind of industries that have relocated to 
these countries are typically female intensive industries (textiles, garments, microelectronics 
assembly). So, women are recognized to benefit more than men from the jobs created in export 
industries. This is simply taken as a differential impact of export growth strategies, as if 
underlying gender relations, for example expressed through the gender wage gap, plays no role in 
bringing precisely such a female-intensive export strategy about. Apart from these examples, in 
which gender is pictured as an exogenous variable, a constraint, or a social differentiated impact 
variable of an economic strategy, the far majority of mainstream macroeconomics completely 
ignores gender. 
The reason for the limited attention to the role of gender in economic analysis is that it is 
not recognized as part and parcel of economic processes and policies. In neoclassical economics, 
certainly in macroeconomics, agents are assumed to be homogeneous, so that rational economic 
man becomes the representative agent in economic analysis. REM, however, is implicitly defined 
in stereotype masculine terms (Folbre, 1994). He is competitive, not cooperative; he follows a 
maximization algorithm without an eye to social and moral context; he is de default head of 
household and breadwinner, who performs no unpaid work unless he regards it as leisure. In 
heterodox economics, gender can be understood as an endogenous variable, shaping and being 
shaped by economic forces, trends and policies. Gender must be understood as, first, shaping 
market processes in terms of access to and control over resources, such as education or incomes, 
second, as shaping people’s choices and opportunities and constraints, for example in segmented 
labour markets with typically feminine and masculine jobs, third, as being inherently part of 
macroeconomic trends, for example through fluctuations in the female labour force participation 
rate, and forth as underlying the household gender division of labour leading to a large female 
intensive unpaid economy. Such a more differentiated and layered understanding of the 
relationship between gender and the economy – as a two way rather than a one way relation, as 
partially positive and partially negative – provides an important social dimension to economic 
analysis, a form of embedding economic analysis in social behavior and structures. As a 
consequence of developing such gender-aware economics, or to put it more explicitly, feminist 
economics, simple, straightforward conclusions on the goodness or badness for women and men 
of certain economic processes or policies can no longer be defended. Economic analysis should 
no longer reduce important influences on the economic process and from the economic process 
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on social phenomena to exogenous variables. One such important force is gender, which 
influences the economy and is at the same time influenced by it, in a two-way process. 
In this chapter, I would like to show that in heterodox economics, particularly feminist 
economics, but also strands of structuralist economics, social economics and institutional 
economics, gender has increasingly been recognized as endogenous to the economic process. This 
implies that not only there are economic impacts that are often different – unequal – for men and 
women, but also that existing gender relations have an impact on the economy, either positive or 
negative, and on economic outcomes. And, that these two directions of the relationships between 
the economy and gender mutually influence each other, directly as well indirectly through 
feedback effects. In neoclassical economics, gender is at most included as simply sex-
disaggregated labour market variables, mostly limited to the labour supply variable. Differences 
in labour supply and its elasticity are then attributed to exogenous variables such as the 
availability of childcare or culture. The analysis of gender differences in the labour market, 
hence, is then reduced to the behavioral question why women behave differently in the labour 
market than men, without understanding how gender affects the economic process and is being 
influenced by dynamic efficiencies, unpaid work, asymmetric institutions, risk-strategies of 
households, path-dependence of institutions that generally benefit males over females. At the 
micro level, there exists already a substantial body of literature on such two-way relationships 
between the economy and gender, in particular in labour economics and household analysis. At 
the macro level, however, the literature on this two-way relationship between gender and the 
economy is still at an early stage of development. But what does emerge from this literature is 
that for a full understanding of the macro economy, gender can no longer be ignored. In the 
present chapter, I will point out in which ways gender helps to improve macroeconomic analysis, 
with examples from my own work in development economics. 
 
2. Micro-meso-macro approach, long-run inefficiencies and short run efficiencies of gender 
inequality 
 
Elson (1995) has developed the so-called micro-meso-macro approach to studying gender 
impacts of macroeconomic policies and feedback effects. The approach focuses on the linkages 
between the micro and macro levels through households, structured labour markets and other 
structured markets (land, credit), gender asymmetries in institutions (welfare regimes, property 
rights, childcare arrangements, tax systems), and macro economic policies (trade, privatisation, 
devaluation). At the same time, the micro-meso-macro approach recognizes trends in 
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macroeconomic variables, such as export volumes or GDP growth rates that are partly driven by 
gender relations (female labour force participation, household dependent agricultural export 
supply response, female or male intensive employment sectors). So, the micro-meso-macro 
approach enables a two-way analytical framework for the analysis of gender and the economy, 
moving back and forth between the micro and macro level of analysis. This framework helps to 
recognize inefficiencies of gender inequality. 
Feminist economists reject the mainstream assumption that economic growth will 
automatically bring a reduction in gender inequality. Inglehart and Norris (2003) conclude from 
their cross-country research that: “growing affluence does tend to generate the expansion of 
literacy and schooling, the establishment of a social protection safety net, and the rise of white-
collar jobs in the service sector, but this process is not inevitable. Nor does it necessarily 
automatically benefit women’s lives” (5f). At the same time, gender inequality can be bad for 
growth, because inequality excludes women from production, it demotivates efforts for 
improvement and hence keeps female productivity low, it may cause social conflict chasing away 
investment, and it allows for male rent-seeking. Hence, there is no straightforward relationship 
between efficiency and equality in general and gender equality in particular. This insight goes 
against the standard way of viewing the relationship between efficiency and equity as a trade-off 
in the welfare theoretical concept of Pareto Optimality. 
One of the first economists who proposed an alternative efficiency notion that does take 
equality into account was also the first woman who received a PhD degree in economics, 
Margaret Reid. She redefined efficiency in a common-sense way as the minimization of waste 
(Reid, 1934; 1943). This basic idea of efficiency as the minimization of waste was recognized 
already by Adam Smith, Karl Marx and Thorstein Veblen. Walsh (2000) reminds us that Smith 
“is savage when he sees the surplus being squandered by the profusion of the great”  (p. 21) and 
he also reminds us that Marx’ concept of exploitation included the recognition of waste of the 
surplus on luxury when it is shifted from labour to capital. While the founder of institutional 
economics, Veblen (1931), has criticized the waste of conspicuous leisure and consumption, 
arguing that “the utility of both alike for the purposes of reputability lies in the element of waste 
that is common to both. In the one case it is a waste of time and effort, in the other it is a waste of 
goods” (p. 126). Veblen (op. cit) particularly pointed at the higher class ideal of the housewife as 
a luxury and a waste of human resources. His contemporary, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, wrote 
about women’s economic position in a similar way, pointing out that women’s household 
production at an individual basis is inefficient as compared to communal kitchens and other forms 
of joint production for family consumption (van Staveren, 2003). Hence, the gender norm of the 
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traditional division of labour between a breadwinner and a housewife implies two forms of waste: 
of female human capital for the labour market and of productivity in ignoring economies of scale 
in household production. 
Reid (1943) referred to her efficiency notion as the minimization of waste to waste in 
consumption when the rich consume far more than the poor; waste in the production of goods that 
have negative externalities (giving the example of tobacco); waste through inefficient methods of 
production (partially related to economies of scale); and waste through market equilibria 
allowing for the under-use and under-investment of production factors (leading to sub-optimal 
land-use and unemployment). In her work in agricultural economics, Reid (1943) argued that the 
partial production for own use among US family farmers was rational in a dynamic perspective in 
a context of uncertainty about yields and world market prices, and therefore efficient for the US 
food sector. The production for own use protected family farmers from food insecurity and 
distress sales in bad times and provided a buffer against too high market volatility. Hence, Reid’s 
understanding of efficiency was a pragmatic one, rejecting the welfare theoretic assumptions of 
perfect markets, constant returns to scale, and absence of power, while recognizing that real 
world economies are influenced by uncertainty, power relations and asymmetric institutions. 
These imperfect conditions of markets require a shift away from efficiency as a static criterion of 
evaluation – the evaluation of an equilibrium – towards a dynamic criterion, evaluating waste in 
the economic process, rather than in an idealized market outcome, as Blaug (2001) has argued. 
Moreover, it shows that under certain conditions, more equality raises efficiency rather than 
lowers it, in particular over the long run. 
In addition, there is a problem with the libertarian belief that free exchange provides the best 
incentive structure for efficiency to occur. Because it ignores the real world situation in which 
quite often some agents lack the endowments for any beneficial exchange – even in the absence 
of market imperfections. In other words, libertarianism assumes that exchange is by definition 
voluntary when not forced or constrained from outside. But voluntary exchange may also involve 
involuntary losses when there is too much imbalance in endowments and opportunities, and 
hence, inequality in bargaining power between market parties. That is why genuine voluntary 
exchange can only exist when there is a feasible non-exchange option (Sen, 1981; Walsh, 2003). 
Without such a fall-back, exchange of one’s last resource or even of non-economic goods such as 
one’s children or bodily integrity, will not be voluntary, but simply the only option available for 
short-term survival. This is precisely why we see illegal transactions of women’s bodies in sex 
trade, as well as involuntary prostitution in many societies where women have limited property 
rights, where inheritance laws are gender biased, and where investment by parents in their 
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children’s human capital is biased against daughters. So, paradoxically, voluntary exchange will 
only be voluntary with what Sen (1981) has labeled a feasible option for autarky. Distress sales or 
underinvestment may be regarded by libertarians as voluntary in a static sense, but they 
undermine an agent’s resource base, and hence, crowd out productive capacity in the long run. 
This is clearly not voluntarily chosen by agents while it is neither efficient in a dynamic sense, 
making people dependent on others or the state. Distress sales or underinvestment can only be 
prevented by trade-independent security, deriving from resources such as savings, wealth, 
community care, access to commons, public goods or welfare support. Most people who 
experience a disadvantaged exchange position have very few resources to provide for themselves, 
except their labour power. And even this may not be in demand, as it may be only potential rather 
than actual labour power, due to lack of nutrition and health (Dasgupta, 1993), or it may not earn 
sufficient market value to survive (Kurien, 1996), or a combination of factors including lack of 
aggregate demand keeping the demand for labour low at any wage rate (Walsh, 1996). Therefore, 
only an institutional setting of markets that acknowledges equal basic entitlements for men and 
women alike and other mechanisms that prevent inequality-inducing accumulation will be able to 
reflect genuine free trade, which may enhance efficiency (van Staveren, 2007c). Below, I will 
refer to two types of inefficiencies from gender inequality in markets. Through the micro-meso-
macro link these inefficiencies tend to have a negative impact on growth, stability, and aggregate 
productivity because of the sheer size of gender-based inefficiencies. 
First, gender inequality is inefficient in the allocation of resources, for example in financial 
markets. In the experience of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, loans to women yield 
substantially higher household consumption than loans to men. In the case of women, it takes an 
average of 0.91 dollars lent to generate 1 dollar of household consumption, as compared with 
1.48 dollars for men (Morduch 1999: 1593). The Grameen experience shows that lending to 
women is not less profitable than lending to men – on the contrary, female repayment rates are 
higher. In 1991, 15.3 per cent of male borrowers from the Grameen Bank missed repayments, 
compared with only 1.3 per cent of female borrowers (Morduch 1999: 1583). Other research on 
micro-credit in Bangladesh concludes that loans to women generally yield higher marginal 
returns than loans to men (Pitt/Khandker 1998). So, discrimination against women in financial 
markets is not only unfair but also inefficient. 
Second, at the aggregate level, gender inequality appears to lead to losses in GDP growth. A 
regression analysis over the period 1960-1992 with GDP growth as the dependent variable and 
education and employment among the independent variables indicates that Sub-Saharan Africa 
has suffered considerable growth losses from gender biases in educational investment. If Sub-
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Saharan Africa had matched East Asia’s growth of educational attainment for women, annual per 
capita GDP growth would have been about 0.5 percentage points higher (World Bank 1999: 15). 
In addition, if Sub-Saharan Africa had matched East Asia’s growth rates in female sector 
employment, annual per capita GDP growth would have increased by more than 0.3 percentage 
points (World Bank 1999: 16). So, together, gender biases in investment in education and in 
employment have reduced annual per capita GDP growth in Sub-Saharan Africa by 0.8 
percentage points (World Bank 1999: 17). In a similar study on the economic losses of missing 
the Millennium Development Goals on gender equality, Klasen and Abu-Ghaida (2004) have 
calculated that off-track countries are likely to suffer between 0.1 and 0.3 percentage points per 
capita growth. 
 The examples point out that discrimination of women is not only unfair but also 
inefficient. This inefficiency is generated through various mechanisms, in which asymmetric 
institutions play an important role: institutions that represent power, and protect the interests of 
the powerful – in this case men and masculine ideals such as being a male breadwinner, - over the 
marginalized, in this case women and the denigration of femininity such as caring roles in the 
household. Another mechanism is the law of diminishing marginal returns, which is ignored by 
common gender beliefs held by individual agents as well as by policy makers that male farmers, 
or male children, are more deserving of scarce investments on their lands or in their human 
capital than women and girls. 
There is, however, also a reverse mechanism which turns gender inequality into a competitive 
advantage, and hence, a mechanism for growth. This mechanism occurs when gender inequality 
reflects exploitation supported by asymmetric institutions of exclusion and discrimination. This is 
particularly the case for the labour market, in which women’s wages tend to be not only lower 
than men’s wages for similar work, but also low relative to women’s average productivity. This is 
generally referred to as the gender wage gap. Stephanie Seguino (2000a and 200b) has 
demonstrated in two empirical studies on the relationship between growth and the gender wage 
gap for manufacturing exporting countries in Asia, that growth is positively correlated with the 
gender wage gap. In other words, her studies have shown that the fast growing Asian economies 
have in effect been able to grow so fast, partially by paying very low wages to women, relative to 
men: countries with the highest gender wage gap appeared to reap the highest export earnings 
relative to their GDP, by using low women’s wages as a major competitive advantage. 
This practice can persist due to imperfections in the labour market, in combination with 
structural unemployment. On average, for developed and developing countries, women’s wages 
are 75% of men’s wages. Some countries do better, with gender wage gaps around 10% (such as 
 8 
Vietnam), whereas other countries have gaps in the range of 30-40% (such as Japan and Korea). 
Of this gender wage gap, about half cannot be explained by gender differences in human capital 
or functional characteristics of women’s and men’s jobs, while the other half is due to gender 
inequalities in education, and the gender division of labour in the household (expressed in 
temporary labour market drop-out due to child raising, or part-time or flexible work in order to 
combine paid work with gender-unequally distributed child care responsibilities).  
In the globalised economy, it is hard to undercut this negative mechanism linking gender 
inequality to growth, when it is used as a competitive advantage. There are, however, two clear 
policy responses indicated in feminist economic analysis that would help to move away from this 
short-run growth strategy and help move developing countries to a long run growth path of 
increasing value added and increasing levels of productivity in their exports, with a lower gender 
wage gap. The first policy strategy is a political economy one, recommending a globally agreed 
minimum labour standards package, such as advocated in the ILO’s Decent Work programme 
(Barrientos, 2007). This package should explicitly include gender equality in wages, the removal 
of gender-based hiring and firing practices that now keep labour markets gender-segregated, and 
a revision of education and training systems away from stereotype feminine and masculine areas 
of specialization. The second policy strategy is a macroeconomic one, advocated, among others, 
by Blecker and Seguino (2002). This policy is geared towards the removal of dynamic 
inefficiencies arising from wage discrimination. These inefficiencies occur in the long run, and 
result from reductions in female labour supply and low work motivation which leads to relatively 
low labour productivity. If the gender wage gap would be eliminated, female labour productivity 
would increase, while, through the increase in female labour supply responding to higher wages, 
the average nominal wage level would not increase proportionally. So, although in the short run 
women’s low wages might be instrumental in keeping production cost competitive, in the long 
run the disincentives to female labour input are likely to create lock-in effects of cheap female 
labour, low productivity, low earnings, and hence, a disadvantaged macro economic strategy for a 
country in the long run, also referred to as ‘low road development’. Removing gender inequalities 
in export sectors would help to prevent such a lock-in into low road development. 
 
3. Gender and trade dynamics 
 
In our book, The Feminist Economics of Trade, we have shown how gender inequality can have 
an impact on trade-related outcomes, such as the terms of trade and the composition of exports 
and domestic versus export output (van Staveren et al., 2007). Shaianne Osterreich (2007) takes 
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as a starting point the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis that the net barter terms of trade between South 
and North tend to deteriorate (a hypothesis for which there is ample empirical support). Prebisch 
and Singer argued that the underlying mechanism for this uneven distribution of gains from trade 
lies in differences in labor markets in the South and North, with workers in the South having less 
ability to bargain for rises in productivity to be matched by rises in wages. Osterreich 
hypothesizes that gender inequality is an important aspect of these labor market differences. 
Using data from a selection of Southern and Northern countries for the period 1975-1995, she 
finds that a decline in the degree of labor market discrimination against women in the South 
relative to the degree of labor market discrimination against women in the North is associated 
with an improvement in the net barter terms of trade of Southern countries. So, if governments in 
the South take action to reduce labor market discrimination against women, this will help to 
counteract the tendency of their terms of trade to fall, bringing a larger share of the gains from 
trade to the South.  
William Darity (2007) examines the ways in which unequal gender relations in 
agriculture interact with attempts to stimulate agricultural exports via devaluation of the currency. 
He develops a model of gender segregation of labor in smallholder export and subsistence (food) 
production, based on the empirical literature on sub-Saharan Africa. Both men and women 
participate in producing export crops, but only women produce subsistence goods. The model 
describes three different regimes of gendered power: coercion, in which men exercise power over 
the time women allocate to export crops, the sales of which are controlled by men; cooperation, in 
which women (guided by social norms of interfamilial behavior) willingly agree to allocate 
unpaid time to export crops; and compensation, in which women will not work on export crops 
without being compensated by their husbands. Darity models the effect of a currency devaluation, 
which raises the price that men get for export crops. Through coercion, co-operation, or 
compensation, women allocate more time to export crop production. The model illuminates how 
different regimes of gendered power affect the impact of export expansion. One inference is that 
if women resist coercion and are unwilling to work without pay, they will not switch into export 
crop production following devaluation, slowing down export expansion (see also Warner and 
Campbell 2000), which helps to explain the low supply response to currency devaluations in 
Africa in the 1980s and 1990s. 
Gender-segregation in production is also a theme of the model presented by Blecker and 
Seguino (2002). Their model is based on the stylized facts of semi-industrialized economies, in 
which women produce a good that is largely for export though some is consumed domestically, 
and men produce a good that is only for the domestic market. Women earn less than men. The 
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model examines the effects on output of an exogenous rise in women’s wages, holding male 
wages and the exchange rate constant.  If export markets are price elastic, and workers’ 
consumption of the export good is low, the output of exports is likely to fall, while the effect on 
production of domestic goods is ambiguous. On the other hand, if export demand is price-
inelastic and worker’s consumption of the export good is high, export production will expand; 
again, the effect on production of domestic goods is ambiguous. But these conditions are less 
likely to be met. Given the realistic assumptions of the model, reducing the gender wage gap by 
raising women’s wages is likely to depress exports and may also depress production of domestic 
goods. If nominal wages of both women and men are flexible, and there is a crawling peg 
exchange rate, the effects are more complex and an increase in women’s wages may be combined 
with export expansion.  
 Ozler (2007) uses plant level data for the period 1986-96 to examine employment by sex 
and skill level in three types of production, non-tradable, import-competing and export. As 
expected, net job creation rates were higher in the export sector than the other sectors for all 
groups of workers. Net job creation rates were higher for females than for males in all sectors, but 
the biggest gender gap was in the import-competing sector, which had the highest ratio of female 
to male job creation rates for production workers. Although women benefited from the gender 
gap in net job creation, women’s employment was more volatile than men’s, as measured by the 
female and male gross job reallocation rate (the sum of gross job creation and gross job 
destruction rates). While the growth of export production increased women’s share of the labor 
force, economy wide factors contributed to making women’s work more precarious than that of 
men. Hence quantitative gender gaps decreased whereas qualitative gender gaps increased. 
Finally, Ebru Kongar (2007), challenges the neoclassical view that increased import 
competition reduces discrimination against women and the gender-wage gap. In a study on effects 
of import competition on the gender wage gap in Taiwan and Korea, Berik and van der Meulen 
(2004) have also challenged the hypothesis that more competition reduces gender discrimination 
in wages. They found that increased competition was positively correlated with wage 
discrimination against women, probably due to a reduction in women’s bargaining power. Kongar 
investigates the wage and employment effects (disaggregated by sex and occupation) of increased 
import competition in the USA in the period 1976-1993, distinguishing between concentrated and 
competitive manufacturing industries. Wages are measured as ‘residual wages’ net of the impact 
of the effects of personal characteristics of workers other than sex, such as education, experience, 
marital status race and location. The study shows that the decline in the residual manufacturing 
gender wage gap, in a context of declining overall employment, was driven by changes in the 
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composition of the female labor force rather than by a reduction of discrimination against women. 
In the concentrated industries, female low-wage production workers suffered disproportionately 
from import-related job losses, raising the average wages of the remaining smaller, more highly 
skilled, female work force, thus reducing the gender wage gap. By contrast, in the competitive 
industries, the female share of low-wage production occupations increased and average female 
wages declined. These differences reflect different firm strategies building on gender-based 
labour market segmentation in the two sectors, with those in the concentrated sector meeting 
import competition by adopting more skill-intensive production and those in the competitive 
sector increasing their use of cheap labor. 
 The studies on gender and trade show that the gender division of labour in the household, 
asymmetric gendered institutions affecting economic behavior of women and men, and labour 
market discrimination have significant economic effects. They limit gains from trade, reduce the 
supply response to exchange rate policy, support an exploitative competitive advantage, generate 
a trade-off between job gain and job security for women, and allow both competitive and 
concentrated industry to exploit the gender wage gap and women’s weaker labour market position 
in strategic responses to globalization. Again, these research results from feminist economics 
show how varied the two-way relationships between gender and the economy are, and that they 
often hold each other hostage in a lose-lose situation, with possible short term gains but long run 
allocative and dynamic inefficiencies. 
 
3.1 An example: EU-Mercosur trade agreement 
 
I will illustrate with an example how trade elasticities of gender inequality may be calculated and 
applied to a particular trade relation in order to detect possible gender-trade relationships (van 
Staveren, 2007a). I will briefly assess the trade agreement between the European Union and 
Mercosur, which was initiated in 1995. Trade between the partner regions has increased since 
1995 but follows a traditional North-South pattern of specialization with Mercosur specializing in 
agricultural exports and EU in manufacturing exports. The data refer to the period 1995-2005. 
The denominator can be calculated in three different ways (in which i refers to a country or a 
region and j refers to a bilateral trading partner, or a trading block, or to all trading partners): 
 trade volumes as a share of GDP of a country or a region: [EXij + IMij]/GDPi  
 bilateral or regional trade volumes as a share of total trade of a country or region: [EXij + 
IMij]/[EXi + IMi] 
 openness measured in tariff reductions of x per centi.  
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In the indicators to be presented in the next section, I will use the first type of trade variable, that 
is, trade (import and export volumes) as a share of GDP. 
For the numerator, there is a potential wide variety of variables available for measuring 
gender inequality, but data limitations as well as limited availability of research on gender effects 
of trade leaves only a small number of variables to be included in the indicators. These are 
variables measuring poverty, employment, wages, time use, childcare, and household food 
security. These variables are for many countries unfortunately only available at the aggregate 
level, while trade impacts can be expected to differ between sectors of the economy, in particular 
between export sectors, import competing sectors and the domestic sector. Nevertheless, they 
may provide a rough picture of the state of the art of gender inequality among trading partners, 
and may point out areas for in-depth research at the sector level. 
 
Below follow some examples for numerator variables:  
 
(1) trade elasticity of the gender gap in earned income 
d[Y
f
/Y]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(2) trade elasticity of the gender gap in labour force participation 
d[L
f
/L]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(3) trade elasticity of gender inequality in export employment 
d[L
f
ex /Lex]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(4) trade elasticity of gender inequality in employment in import competing sectors 
d[L
f
imc/Limc]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(5) trade elasticity of the gender gap in unemployment rates 
d[U
f
/U
m
]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(6a) trade elasticity of gendered job segregation 
dID/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(6b) trade elasticity of gendered job segregation in the export sector 
d[IDex]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
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(6c) trade elasticity of gendered job segregation in the import competing sector 
[IDimc]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(7) trade elasticity of relative women’s wages in the export sector compared to other 
sectors 
d[W
f
ex/W
f
]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(8) trade elasticity of the gender gap in unpaid labour time 
 d[UNPT
f
/UNPT
m
]/d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
(9) trade elasticity of women’s purchasing power for food 
 d[[Y
f
/female population]/Pfood]/ d[EXij + IMij]/GDPi] 
 
Filling in data for Mercosur-EU trade and gender inequality in the Mercosur countries, I found 
that the trade elasticity for food affordability is unity and negative (-42/41.9 = -1). Mercosur 
exports mainly food items, the same that are consumed domestically. This may have led to a 
crowding out of domestic food supply by foreign demand, following the currency devaluations. 
The indicator suggests that it has become more difficult for women to perform their assigned 
roles in household as food providers, because women in Mercosur are net food buyers, not 
growers (over 80 percent of the population lives in urban areas). This is even more so the case, 
because absolute female (and male) income levels have declined over the period. 
The indicator for the female employment share in the major export sector, agriculture, is 
negative and inelastic (-5.7/77.3 = -0.1). So, the enormous increase in agricultural exports has not 
helped to increase the female employment share in this stable and expanding export sector in 
Mercosur. At the same time, we find that the trade indicator for the male employment share the 
major import sector, manufacturing, is negative and elastic (-28.5/12.6 = -2.3). Thus there has 
been an increase in women’s share of jobs in the sector that faces import competition. But, 
whereas in many other developing countries, a move of women from agriculture to manufacturing 
is generally an improvement of their employment condition since manufacturing is an expanding 
factor, in Mercosur it implies a shift away from an expanding stable export sector towards a 
vulnerable import-competing sector. 
It is interesting to note that the gender wage gap has worsened for agriculture and 
improved for manufacturing. This may reflect shifts in relative labor scarcity along gender lines, 
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because, as we have seen, the female employment share in agriculture has declined, while it has 
increased in the manufacturing sector. Finally, the case study also suggests that there may be 
impacts from persistent gender inequalities in Mercosur, such as in the labor market, on its trade 
relationship with the EU. In particular, the data seem to suggest that the ‘lock-in’ situation of 
Mercosur in a traditional trade pattern with EU (exports of primary products and imports of 
manufactures) may actually be reinforced by the gender inequalities in the labor markets of the 
four countries in South America. Whereas women’s average level of education is higher than that 
of men, they are paid less and find themselves increasingly employed in a sector which is 
threatened by imported manufactured goods from the EU. This does not seem to be the most 
efficient allocation of human resources and is not very likely to help Mercosur to move into 
higher value-added exports, because that would require a better use of human resources, partly 
through higher returns to female human capital, which in turn would help to stimulate labor 
productivity. Trade with other external partners, as well as intra-Mercosur trade, appears to be 
less traditional. Catão and Falcetti (2002), for example, have shown the importance of the 
Brazilian market for the expansion of Argentinean manufacturing exports, at least during the first 
seven years of Mercosur (1991-1997). A recent Mercosur report shows that currently, exports to 
the rest of the world have an increasing share of higher technology (IDB 2004). Hence, it is not 
unlikely that these other trading partners provide more opportunities for higher value-added 
exports than the trade relationship with the EU. 
 In conclusion, the Mercosur-EU trade agreement has not benefited women’s economic 
position whereas the gender division of labour and gender-based labour market segmentation 
seems to reinforce the traditional trade pattern, in which South America finds itself locked-in to a 
low value added and low employment generating trade pattern with the EU. Machismo apparently 
has a macroeconomic price for the gains from trade – an inefficiency arising from gender 
inequality. 
 
4. Gendered institutions and access to resources 
 
Recent literature on women’s empowerment acknowledges that empowerment involves more 
than access to resources but also implies agency and an enabling institutional context, which 
together help women to achieve better wellbeing outcomes (Kabeer, 2001; Narayan, 2005a; 
Alsop, Bertelsen, Holland, 2006; Ibrahim and Alkire, 2007). In the light of the recent literature on 
women’s empowerment, I have analyzed the role of resources relative to women’s agency, 
captured by gendered institutions that limit this agency (van Staveren, 2007b). One of the 
 15 
definitions of empowerment emerging from the literature has been formulated by Deepa Nayaran 
(2005b: 5): ‘Empowerment is the expansion of assets and capabilities of poor people to 
participate in, negotiate with, influence, control, and hold accountable institutions that affect their 
lives.’ Although there are some differences, the literature tends to agree that women’s 
empowerment is a process involving agency (referred to in the definition above with wordings 
like ‘negotiate’, ‘influence’, and ‘control’), access to resources (or assets), and institutions, which 
enable women to improve their wellbeing, absolutely, and more importantly, relative to men. 
The role of resources for women’s empowerment is well understood. For example, access 
to land (Agarwal, 1994; Doss, 2006; Allendorf, 2007), access to credit (Kabeer, 2001) and access 
to education (Jejeebhoy, 1995) have all been shown to be important for women’s empowerment, 
and in turn, for economic development (Klasen, 2002; Lagerlöf, 2003). But next to a lack of 
access to tangible resources, women also face a variety of intangible constraints to plan their 
lives, to choose their goals, and to make their own choices, inside and outside households, often 
more so than men. Such constraints, understood as gendered institutions (Goetz, 1997), limit their 
opportunities both in terms of access to resources as well as their agency (Narayan, 2005b). 
Institutional economics distinguishes between formal institutions, such as laws and regulations, 
and informal institutions, which are intangible norms, followed without much questioning 
(Williamson, 2000, Hodgson, 2006). Both types of institutions reflect power relations since 
institutions tend to be supported and defended by those who derive advantages from these. For 
gendered institutions, these power relations are embedded in formal and informal expressions of 
patriarchy (Folbre, 1994; Goetz, 1997). Formal gendered institutions than can be interpreted as 
codified gendered social norms such as inheritance laws, property rights, or the fiscal system, 
with different effects for women and men. On the other hand, informal gendered institutions can 
be understood as the set of non-codified social norms and cultural practices that impact 
differently on men and women. This influence of informal gendered institutions leads to 
stereotype masculine and feminine agency, Bina Agarwal (1997: 1) has explained, by ‘ascribing 
to women and men different abilities, attitudes, desires, personality traits, behaviour patterns, and 
so on’. This not only results in adaptive preferences (Sen, 1990), which are an internalization of 
gender inequalities in one’s choices, but experimental research has indicated that gender 
stereotypes also lead to different self-evaluations, lowering women’s self-esteem, motivation and 
confidence (Biernat et al., 1998; Shih et al., 2006). Hence, women’s agency seems negatively 
affected by gendered rules, laws and rights – formal gendered institutions – on the one hand, and 
gendered social norms, cultural practices and beliefs – informal gendered institutions – on the 
other hand. 
 16 
Given the limitations of working with a cross-country dataset, I employ a simplified 
model. In this model, variables express gender gaps rather than absolute values. Women’s 
achievements are measured as gender gaps in achievements in health and decision making power. 
Resources are defined in terms of women’s relative access to education (gender gaps in combined 
primary and secondary school enrolment rates) and to jobs (female share of the non-agricultural 
labour force). The two categories of institutions, formal and informal, each consist of three 
variables, which are taken from the online OECD-GID (Gender, Institutions and Development) 
database. The two models to be tested reflect the role of gendered institutions in the 
empowerment literature that gendered institutions not only affect women’s and men’s access to 
resources but also impact directly on women’s achievements, through affecting their agency, 
irrespective of their access to resources. This feminist economic analysis of institutions 
challenges the mainstream view that when women are given access to resources, such as 
schooling or income, they will automatically achieve similar economic outcomes as men. The 
macro-level empirical analysis summarized here, indicates, that such a view of gender as an 
exogenous variable is too simplistic. Gender is not only a constraint on women’s access to 
resources, but it also affects their economic behaviour – their agency, options, decision making 
power and strategies, which in turn perpetuate unequal gender relationships in households, 
markets and the economy as a whole. 
The two resource variables that have been selected, are key variables in the women’s 
empowerment literature: access to education and paid employment. They are measured as the 
gender gap in the combined primary and secondary school enrolment rate (FMedu) and the 
female share of the non-agricultural labour force (Fnalf). For outcomes, or achievements, the two 
variables selected are: female/male ratio in life expectancy (FMlife) and female decision making 
power (Fdec) in politics and the economy. The variables on gendered institutions lie between zero 
and one: the more asymmetric the institutions are, disadvantaging women, the closer the values 
are to one. Six variables were chosen from the thirteen gendered institutions in the GID data base. 
the variables were grouped into formal and informal institutions, each with three variables. 
Formal gendered institutions: (1) laws on parental authority (PA), defined as the extent to which 
parental authority is granted to the mother, both parents equally, or to the father; (2) laws on 
violence against women (VIO), with laws in three areas: on domestic violence, rape, and sexual 
harassment; (3) women’s land rights (LR), defined as women’s access to land ownership. 
Informal gendered institutions: (1) share of women marrying under 20 years old (EM), defined as 
the share of girls in the age group of 15-19 years old who are or have been married; (2) 
prevalence of FGM (FGM): share of women affected by female genital mutilation; (3) missing 
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women (MW), defined as the difference between the number of women that should be alive in a 
country, with gender equality, and the actual number of women. 
The first step in the empirical analysis is the testing of the resource models for education 
and employment. The two models have independent variables RESi, with i referring to women’s 
relative access to education (FMedu) and their share in the non-agricultural labour force (Fnalf). 
The dependent variables are a constant, C, the three formal and three informal gendered 
institutions, referred to as FGIj and IFGIk, with ε as the error term: 
 
RESi = C + β1FGIj + β2IFGIk + ε        (1) 
 
The results in table 1 show that both variables have the expected negative sign and are 
statistically significant. The two resource models have two implications. First, the more 
asymmetric gender norms and practices are, the less is women’s access to resources. This 
confirms the bi-variate results obtained by the initiators of the GID database, Christian Morrisson 
and Johannes Jütting (2005). Second, the model suggests that informal institutions are a slightly 
stronger constraint for women’s access to education while formal institutions seem to be a bit 
more constraining for women’s access to jobs. This, in turn, suggests that both formal and 
informal gendered institutions are serious constraints for women’s economic position, each in 
their own way for particular resources, which in turn limits a country’s economic development 
through limitations on women’s human capital development. 
 
 
Table 1. Resource Model with Aggregate Institutions 
Independent 
variables 
FMedu Fnalf 
FGI -0.30*** 
(-3.63) 
-0.41*** 
(-5.44) 
IFGI -0.38*** 
(-4.50) 
-0.32*** 
(-4.17) 
Constant ***  
(64.09) 
*** 
(32.10) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.36*** 
(40.88) 
0.42*** 
(55.04) 
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N 142 153 
Notes: Standardized coefficients (beta) with t-statistics 
 in brackets. Level of significance for t-statistics for  
independent variables and for F-statistic for adjusted R
2
: 
= p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. Sources: GID. 
Source: van Staveren, 2007b. 
 
The models for women’s achievements can be specified as follows: 
 
ACHl = C + β3FGIj + β4IFGIk + β5GDPln + β6GDPlnSQ + β7RESi + ε   (2) 
 
Achievements (ACHl) are measured as the female/male ratio in life expectancy and the average 
share of women as parliamentarians, administrative persons and managers, and professionals and 
technicians. GDPln and GDPlnSQ are control variables for level of development, also included as 
a squared variable in order to account for possible nonlinearity, since the sample includes both 
developing and developed countries. FMedu and Fnalf are the two resource variables RESi, as 
before.  
 
 
Table 2. Empowerment Model with Resources and Institutions 
Independent 
variables 
FMlife Fdec 
GDPln 3.12** 
(2.56) 
-0.60 
(-0.53) 
GDPlnSQ -3.02** 
(-2.50) 
0.74 
(0.66) 
FGI -0.10 
(-0.95) 
-0.31*** 
(-3.09) 
IFGI -0.18* 
(-1.68) 
-0.02) 
(-0.20) 
Fnalf 0.35*** 
(3.63) 
0.26*** 
(2.90) 
FMedu -0.16 
(-1.63) 
0.06 
(0.60) 
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Constant *** 
(4.07) 
 
(0.74) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.30*** 
(10.05) 
0.42*** 
(14.75) 
N 128 127 
Notes: Standardized coefficients (beta) with t-statistics in brackets. 
Level of significance for t-statistics for independent variables and  
for F-statistic for adjusted R
2
; *= p < 0.1; ** = p < 0.05; *** = p < 0.01. 
Sources: GID and World Development Indicators 2006. Empowerment 
data for period 2003-2005. 
Source: van Staveren, 2007b. 
 
 
The results for the achievement models as presented in table 2 suggests quite varied relationships 
for women’s empowerment. The achievement model for the gender gap in health, measured as 
the male/female ratio in life expectancy (FMlife), shows that the level of GDP per capita has the 
strongest impact. It is a positive impact for most countries (3.12), but negative for rich countries 
(-3.02), reflecting that men are catching up with women’s life expectancy rate when countries get 
richer, with women following less healthy lifestyles, including through smoking and overweight, 
in richer countries (see for example on the US: Ezzati et al., 2008). Of the two resource variables, 
only one is statistically significant, women’s access to employment, with a parameter value of 
0.35. This suggests that women’s own income improves their access to health care. Formal 
gendered institutions do not but informal institutions do have a small statistically significant 
negative impact on women’s relative health (-0.18). This suggests that gender biased laws and 
regulations do not seem to affect women’s health outcomes but that informal institutions, namely 
social norms and cultural practices do appear to affect health. One possible mechanism through 
which this may take place may be illustrated with a qualitative study on the effect of social norms 
on women’s use of health care in Burkina Faso (Nikièma, Haddad and Potvin, 2008). The study 
found that a woman’s use of health care does not depend on her having the money to pay for 
medicine or a hospital visit, but is conditional on the husbands’ evaluation of her behaviour, in 
particular hard working and showing respect to him and his family. The men in the study also 
said to suspect their wives feigning illness as an excuse to get out of daily chores, a suspicion 
which constrained the permission men gave for their wives to seek health care. This is, of course, 
just an illustration of how the mechanism from informal gendered institutions may affect 
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women’s empowerment. In general, though, the model seems to indicate that women’s agency to 
achieve better health in developing countries seems constrained by the lack of an independent 
income as well as by social norms preventing women to seek healthcare.  
The other achievement model, the model for women’s decision making power, shows a 
different picture. Here, the level of economic development has no statistically significant impact, 
nor has women’s education relative to men’s. Women’s relative access to jobs has a moderate 
positive and statistically significant impact on women’s decision making power (0.26). This may 
be explained probably not so much by the income effect but by the social participation effect of 
non-agricultural jobs for women, an effect which is also important for taking up leadership 
positions in politics, administration, and management. Finally, when looking at the results for 
gendered institutions, we see that this time the parameter for the informal gendered institutions is 
small and not statistically significant, whereas the one for formal gendered institutions is 
negative, relatively large and statistically significant (-0.31). Hence, it is not so much social 
norms and cultural practices that constrain women’s leadership roles but formal constraints to 
gender equality in politics and the labour market which form hurdles for women to break through 
the glass ceiling. In many developing countries, positions of power are inextricably connected to 
wealth and/or families, so that when property rights exclude or marginalize women, women will 
be disadvantaged when competing for leadership positions. An illustration of this connection is 
the observation that relatively many female presidents and prime ministers in Asia have achieved 
their position through their fathers or husbands, despite serious gender biases in these countries’ 
institutions (Thompson and Derichs, 2005). 
The overall picture from the two achievement models that emerges is threefold. First, the 
level of development has an important impact on women’s achievements in health but not on 
political and economic decision making power, and the impact of the level of GDP per capita is 
reversed for developed countries. This suggests that the level of development as such is 
insufficient to explain women’s empowerment, so that development policies should pay attention 
to the extent to which development implies opportunities for women. This is an indication that 
gender is more than just an exogenous variable in the development process. Second, depending 
on the type of achievement, sometimes formal institutions and other times informal institutions 
appear to be stronger constraints on women’s empowerment. Third, the results point out that 
women’s access to resources is important but not sufficient for women’s empowerment. 
Gendered institutions seem to put a serious constraint on women’s agency, which prevents them 
from turning their resources into wellbeing achievements. As a consequence, women’s 
empowerment requires not only access to resources, but also the dismantling of formal and 
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informal gendered institutions. Such policies would not only help to increase the effectiveness of 
resources for women’s empowerment, but would also have a direct positive effect on women’s 
agency, for example through higher self-esteem or more mobility. 
A general implication for policy makers that seems to emerge from the analysis is that 
shifting the attention from a rather exclusive concern with gender as an exogenous constraint on 
access to resources towards simultaneously removing gendered institutions as an endogenous 
influence on women’s economic position would make gender policy and economic development 
more effective. 
 
5. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
 
PRSPs are a major macroeconomic policy instrument for developing countries and required by 
World Bank and IMF as a condition for loans. The macroeconomic framework of PRSPs 
however, is not a neutral set of macroeconomic policies but embedded precisely in a wider, 
neoliberal policy environment supported by the Washington Consensus – referred to as the 
‘Unholy Trinity’ of the IMF, World Bank and WTO, by Peet (2003). It is this PRSP framework 
of growth, stability, external and internal balance, that constitutes one of the most explicit 
formulations of this consensus (see also Cammack, 2004), while being complemented by social 
safety nets as supplementary social policies, as Craig and Porter (2003) have recognized. “PRSPs, 
we argue, are best seen as part of a ‘Third Way’ re-morphing of neoliberal approaches, a new 
convergence in which governments and agencies of various stripes in both liberal OECD and 
developing countries are focusing on optimizing economic, juridical and social governance in 
order to create ideal conditions for international finance and investment” (Craig and Porter, 2003: 
54). So, while the macroeconomic framework of PRSPs can be regarded as the most concrete 
manifestation of neoliberal policies, I will argue that the resistance of gender mainstreaming of 
such policies is part and parcel of this framework, for each of its core elements, leaving gender to 
the social policies – the equity side – of PRSPs (van Staveren, 2008).  
 
5.1 Domestic Price Stability and Exchange Rate Policy 
A major core element of the PRSP macroeconomic framework is domestic price stability. This is 
a policy area with inherent contradictions, which clearly have gender dimensions. The 
stabilization of the internal price level, aimed at limiting inflation, often makes use of 
contractionary monetary policy and a high interest rate. However, this will raise problems for 
holders of debt, and may lead to bankruptcies of, in particular, small and medium scaled 
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enterprises, as happened as a consequence of IMF advised high interest rate policies after the 
Asian financial crisis (Stiglitz, 2002). In many countries in Africa and Asia, women are the 
majority of micro and small scale entrepreneurs, and are therefore very vulnerable to such 
contractionary monetary policy. Moreover, deflationary policies tend to go hand in hand with 
increasing female unemployment rates, at higher levels and higher rates of increase than for men, 
in developing countries as well as in transition economies (UNRISD, 2005). Also, deflationary 
policies prevent governments from dealing effectively with recessions due to the high cost of 
borrowing (Elson and Çaĝatay, 2000), which induces a substitution effect from paid to unpaid 
work, largely carried out by women. These gender effects of stabilization policies reflect the 
biased emphasis of deflationary policies on security for global investors vis-à-vis workers, small 
scale entrepreneurs, and those responsible for meeting household needs. 
 The macroeconomic framework also often involves exchange rate devaluation. A 
currency devaluation will benefit export earnings and employment, including women’s 
employment. But, at the same time, imports will become more expensive, so that devaluation can 
put pressure on basic household expenditures, such as food or agricultural inputs, which, 
depending on the gender division of labour in households, may hit women harder than men 
(Warner and Campbell, 2000). In short, whereas exchange rate devaluation may help to expand 
women’s low-wage export employment, but make imports more expensive, the emphasis on 
internal price stability tends to have negative feedback effects on women’s wage employment, 
survival of small businesses, and support from public services. 
 
5.2 External Balance 
Another core element is concerned with external balance, often implying the promotion of 
exports, import tariff reductions, and inviting foreign capital. Export promotion policies tend to 
increase female employment in labour-intensive manufacturing. While this is a positive effect for 
women’s labour market opportunities, the quality of jobs tends to be low, while labour standards 
in export production come under increasing pressure of the unequal bargaining power between 
globally mobile capital and relatively immobile labour (Palley, 2004). This, in turn, together with 
the increased competition from imports, leads to an increasing flexibilization of jobs, particularly 
for women who work at the lower end of global production systems (Standing, 1999). In 
agriculture, the incentive is to shift away from food crops to cash crop production. But this shift 
may not be very effective, precisely due to the gender division of labour combined with male 
control of cash. When women’s role as food provider for households is ignored in export 
promotion policies, the supply response to such policies will be limited and the distribution of 
 23 
benefits within the household will be gender-biased. In conclusion, the external balance policies 
of PRSPs ignore negative impacts on women through informalization and flexibilization on the 
one hand and increased unpaid workloads on the other hand. Moreover, such policies tend to 
ignore negative feedback effects for the external position in the long run through lock-in effects 
in low road development. 
 
5.3 Internal Balance 
A third core element of the PRSP macroeconomic framework concerns internal balance – the 
reduction or even elimination of a budget deficit. The contractionary policies aimed at reducing 
the budget deficit are likely to hurt those groups in society that are most dependent upon 
redistributive policies through public expenditures, including women, given their gender role as 
carers (Elson and Çaĝatay, 2000). Moreover, women already tend to be disadvantaged by gender 
biases in public expenditures, as gender audits of government budgets have shown (Norton and 
Elson, 2002). Hence, budget cuts tend to re-inforce the male bias in public expenditures. Indeed, a 
recent UNRISD (2005) study has shown that fiscal restraint tends to be paralleled by a reduction 
in social expenditures, which, in turn, tends to shift the responsibility for meeting social needs to 
women’s unpaid workload. Ertürk and Çaĝatay (1995) have shown in a business cycle model for 
Turkey how women’s unpaid work may indeed substitute for lost household income during 
downturns in the business cycle, suggesting that anti-cyclical fiscal policy may help to keep 
social expenditures up and prevent a shift of social services provisioning to women’s unpaid work 
time. 
Contrary to an over-concern with internal balance, an increase in social expenditures, 
including investment in women’s health, education, and employment, in order to reduce gender 
gaps as targeted in the Millennium Development Goals, is likely to crowd-in women’s human 
resources investment, labour force participation, and productivity (Krug and van Staveren, 2002). 
 
The above analysis of how gender is ignored in the macroeconomic framework of PRSPs shows 
that gender is not regarded as a relevant variable – not as enabling nor as constraining – for the 
core set of macroeconomic policies. The only place where we do find serious attention to gender 
in PRSPs is outside the macroeconomic framework, in the social policy sections. The 
macroeconomic framework ignores that gender equality often is a precondition for poverty 
reduction: more low-wage jobs increase women’s employment but when these are increasingly 
flexible and informal sub-contracting jobs attracted by low female wages, such jobs will hardly 
contribute to poverty reduction; liberalization policies may eliminate market distortions, but those 
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distortions that have their roots in discriminatory attitudes at the supply or demand side of 
markets can only be eliminated by more, not less, state regulation and enforcement; reductions in 
public expenditures may attract more foreign capital but conflicts with the need to invest in order 
to meet the Millennium Development Goals by the year 2015, including the elimination of gender 
gaps as stated in the third MDG goal. 
In conclusion, the resistance of the macroeconomic framework to gender mainstreaming 
is not only constraining the likeliness of reducing women’s poverty but also limiting the 
effectiveness of PRSPs to increase growth and to move a country up the high road of 
development. In other words, ignoring the endogeneity of gender in the economy negatively 
affects the effectiveness of PRSPs, so that gender blindness, in fact, becomes an additional reason 
why “the macroeconomic frameworks as currently designed do not really support economic 
growth and poverty reduction in a direct, clear way” (Gottschalk, 2005: 440).  
 
6. Gender inequality and global finance 
 
The gender dimensions in finance occur at all levels: the micro level (including the intra-
household level), the meso level (industry, banking, government institutions, taxation), and the 
macro level, nationally as well as globally (global markets and the role of global level institutions 
such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Bank and IMF). This section will 
discuss three gender biases of global finance (van Staveren, 2002): (1) the under-representation of 
women in financial decision making; (2) increased gender gaps in the economic positions of 
women and men; (3) gender-based instability of financial markets. 
 
6.1 Undemocratic: Under-Representation of Women 
Women are hardly represented among the main decision makers in financial markets and 
institutions, which makes women’s issues even more invisible in the decision making processes 
on government lending, investment rules, and private sector financial activities. Decisions on 
World Bank loans and IMF credit are taken by the boards of these institutions, governing bodies 
that are strongly male dominated (in World Bank less than 10 % of Executive Directors and 
Senior Officers are female). The G-7 countries have performed over the course of the 1990s the 
role of the world’s lender of last resort, together with World Bank and IMF. G-7 decision making 
can hardly be regarded as democratic, and certainly not as gender balanced. WTO is almost 
exclusively a male forum. Decisions on FDI taken in the board rooms of transnational companies, 
which are largely though not exclusively, headed by men. And last but not least, financial traders 
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are largely men – whereas an increasing share of women can be found in financial services in 
lower end jobs, the typical financial whizz-kid positions of trading in anonymous financial 
markets are largely taken up by men. The consequences of these abstract financial decisions are 
born by women and men as producers, consumers, borrowers, employees, tax payers, users of 
public services, and home and community care providers.  
 A more equal representation of men and women in the boards of international financial 
institutions, national financial institutions, and national and trans-national private corporations, 
would make financial decision making more democratic from a gender perspective. It is likely 
that a more equal gender balance in decision making on financial governance will represent both 
men’s as well as women’s experiences with financial markets and policies and hence prevent the 
large opportunity costs that women now experience in the realm of global finance. However, 
consciousness about gender inequalities and interests do not necessarily coincide for elite women 
and poor women. So, representation of women in boards of financial institutions is a necessary 
but insufficient condition for gender-aware decision making. Financial decision making should 
also take poor women's views into account, as stakeholders in the world of finance, for example 
by consulting women’s NGO’s. Only then a more balanced gender distribution in financial 
decision making – in numbers of men and women as well as in terms of a less dominant 
masculine management culture – would begin to impact positively on the distribution of the 
positive and negative effects of financial policies over men and women.  
 
6.2 Inequitable: Increased Gender Gaps 
Globalization of finance has had advantages for women: it has increased competition, and hence 
the supply of credit, to diversified target groups; through this process women have gained more 
access to credit, although not equally in the formal and informal sectors. Secondly, in some 
countries it has become easier for women to access foreign exchange markets, for example to 
receive remittances from partners or relatives abroad, or to send home remittances to family. 
However, the few studies that have looked into gender effects of finance are not very optimistic 
about the globalisation gains for women. 
Financial markets are clearly no homogeneous markets and in that respect they are not 
different from goods markets or labour markets. Like other markets, financial markets are 
characterised by segmentation, involving distortions and transaction costs (Yotopoulos and Floro, 
1992). Most texts on distortions in financial markets completely ignore the gender dimension, but 
there are a few exceptions. In particular Baden (1996) has distinguished a variety of gender-based 
distortions in credit markets. These distortions are perceived as transaction costs by the supply 
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side (credit institutions) as well as by the demand side (individual female borrowers as compared 
with male borrowers), limiting the net gains from financial  
 
Table 3: Gender-Based Distortions in Financial Markets 
Type of 
gender-based 
distortion: 
Transaction costs for credit 
institution: 
Transaction costs for female 
borrowers: 
 
 
Information 
constraint 
 
Women are perceived as risky, 
not creditworthy enough; 
information gathering might go 
through an intermediary 
(husband) 
Women have lower literacy rates, 
and are less mobile, which results in 
low access to financial market 
information 
 
Negotiation 
constraint 
 
Women have less experience in 
taking formal credit, which 
requires more time from bank 
personnel 
Women may need husband’s 
permission; have higher opportunity 
costs to travel to a bank; women 
may face discriminatory attitude by 
bank personnel 
 
Monitoring 
constraint 
 
Women’s economic activities 
may be more difficult to monitor 
since they are often in different 
and smaller scale sectors than 
men’s activities that are financed 
through credit 
Women may find it difficult to 
control their loans in the household 
when other family members 
(particularly men) find it in their 
right to exercise control over this 
money 
 
Enforcement 
constraint 
 
Women often lack formal 
property rights, which makes it 
difficult for creditors to claim a 
collateral when a loan is not 
repaid 
Women may be more susceptible to 
pressure, intimidation, or violence 
from creditors or their agents; 
women may lose control over their 
loans in the household while still 
being responsible for repayment. 
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Source: Adapted from Table 1 in S. Baden (1996) ‘Gender Issues in Financial Liberalisation and Financial Sector 
Reform’. Paper prepared for EU (DG VIII) and OECD DAC/WID. Sussex: BRIDGE. See also van Staveren (2002). 
 
 
transactions with women and making financial services for women less accessible and more 
expensive. The source of the distortions is often not real but irrational, based on a gender 
ideology that assumes women to be less capable of economic success than men. Just like gender 
biases in labour markets (masculine and feminine sectors and jobs) and land markets (absent or 
limited land property rights for women) lead to segmentation to the disadvantage of women, 
segmentation of financial markets according to gender creates disadvantages for women. At the 
same time, segmentation creates inefficiencies in resource allocation, an issue that will be 
discussed later on. From Table 3 it becomes clear how gender biases in society at large (like the 
prejudice that “women are less able to make investments profitable” for example) operate in 
financial markets and make them gender biased. Apart from transaction costs, some gender 
distortions lead to costs that are part of the service itself, like administration costs rather than 
transaction costs that occur outside the exchange. Because of less property and lower earnings of 
women, and because of their responsibility for household livelihood, women tend to save smaller 
amounts as well as to save and borrow more regularly compared with men. Women therefore 
need flexibility in saving and credit. However, credit institutions are not always prepared to 
provide this flexibility because of the corresponding administration costs.  
Moreover, the almost universal norm of the male breadwinner and head of household has 
benefited men’s property rights within households (Francine Blau, Marianne Ferber, and Anne 
Winkler, 1992; Naila Kabeer, 1994; Bina Agarwal, 1994). Women’s property rights are often 
assumed to be included in household rights that are, in turn, often secured in the name of the 
(male) household head. In some countries, inheritance laws allocate less property to female heirs 
compared to male heirs, whereas widows are sometimes bereft of all the common property they 
shared with their husband, by the family-in-law. Women’s limited possession of property and 
their constrained property rights limit their access to financial markets. This may lead to a lack of 
effective demand for credit by women, and may also discourage the accumulation of savings by 
women.  
Furthermore, there exists gendered segmentation in financial markets. Vertical gender 
segmentation in financial markets runs along the line of scale: small loans tend to be demanded 
more often by women, larger loans more by men. Horizontal gender segmentation in financial 
markets is expressed by the fact that most female lenders lend to women, while most women 
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borrowers borrow from credit institutions that have special programmes for women, or that 
exclusively target female borrowers, or informally within women’s groups. Because of the 
gendered transaction costs referred to in Table 3 above, credit institutions show adverse selection 
in their behaviour: they select borrowers on the basis of their gender. This leads to the crowding 
in of female borrowers into a limited range of credit supply, which drives interest rates up in this 
sub-credit market. Or, in other words, excess demand for credit leads credit institutions to use 
quantity rather than price rationing to allocate funds (Yotopoulos and Sagrario Floro, 1992: 304), 
which in a context of gender segmentation of credit markets, leads them to exclude women and 
women’s activities (like home-base production) from their portfolios (Baden, 1996). Gender 
segmentation in the division of labour thus reinforces gender segmentation in financial markets, 
indicating the relatedness of gendered institutions throughout the economy, with various feedback 
effects. 
 Discriminatory views held by credit institutions’ personnel that women would be risky 
borrowers, that they would be less skilled entrepreneurs then men, and hence, less profitable, or 
that they would spend borrowed money on consumption without being able to repay, is a 
significant constraint on women’s interactions in financial markets. Reality is different however. 
First, women tend to have high repayment rates, which defeats the prejudice against female 
borrowers: repayment rates of credit programmes that exclusively or in majority lend to women 
are around 97% (Women’s World Banking, 1996, see footnote 12). Second, when women borrow 
for consumption purposes it is often to overcome short term liquidity problems that they can 
solve by long run cash flows, not endangering repayment (Baden, 1996).  
At the macro level, gendered institutions impact on financial markets as a whole: through 
the savings rate, interest rate, and investments. As Baden (1996) concludes from the literature that 
she reviewed, the globalisation of financial markets through liberalisation has not succeeded in 
substantially raising savings rates. Investments have increased in some developing countries, 
depending on the inflow of FDI and World Bank loans and IMF credits, but not enough. 
Liberalised interest rates have moved in the direction of international market rates, but 
nevertheless they have not been able to generate effective and efficient financial markets in many 
developing countries. Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa (1999: 1621) conclude from a review 
of inequality and global markets that: “(a) inequality reduces investment opportunities (b) 
inequality worsens borrower’s incentives (…)”. As an elaboration of this argument, the point can 
be made that gender inequality in financial markets reduces investment opportunities even further 
since it constrains women to invest and it worsens borrower’s incentives since it discriminates 
against female borrowers. So, gender inequality is likely to contribute to aggregate low savings 
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rates, low investment rates, and distorted interest rates. Hence, also at the macro level, gender 
appears to be an endogenous variable, affecting monetary variables. 
 
6.3 Unstable: Gender-Based Instability in Financial Markets 
The lack of democracy in financial governance and the inequities that financial markets create are 
not only problematic in themselves but have also an impact on the stability of financial markets 
(Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Penalosa, 1999: 1628). The annual volume of foreign exchange 
transactions is about fifty times the volume of international trade in goods and services. The 
Asian financial crisis created reductions in the monetized real economy of over 10% of GDP, 
whereas the 2008 financial crisis led to lower but still significant reductions in GDP in the 
developed world. The instability that occurs along with these changes are increasingly perceived 
by some economists as having endogenous roots, rather than as occurring from outside shocks as 
is the common wisdom in mainstream economics. Endogenous causes of market instability are 
inherent in the structure of financial markets and financial institutions. 
The burden of excessive financial risk is, however, not only shifted to tax payers and the 
public sector, but also to another part of the economy that is invisibly and silently called in at a 
crisis to balance the losses of financial markets: the care economy. Here, there is a need to 
include a gender perspective in the analysis. The shift of the burden of excessive risk by financial 
market actors incurring debts to finance increasingly risky investments and speculative 
transactions, is almost exclusively a male strategy. As I have argued above, the decision making 
positions in the world of finance are held by men, transactions with larger amounts of money are 
mainly done by men, and speculation is mainly a male activity. This is important to note because 
the persons to whom the burden of risk is shifted are predominantly female, and hence, the 
mechanism underlying the extent and impact of recent financial crises is highly gender biased. 
The burden of excessive risk that is shifted to the state not only concerns taxpayers but more 
importantly the burden is shifted to the users of public services, since, in most developing 
countries, government budget deficits are approached through budget cuts rather than through 
(politically often infeasible) increases in tax revenue. Because of a gender division of labour in 
most economies in North and South, women are made responsible for household food security, 
family health care and securing household supplies such as energy for cooking and safe drinking 
water. Cuts in the health budget, or in budgets concerning the provision of clean drinking water in 
poor urban districts and far away villages, and the abolishment of food subsidy to the urban poor 
or of input subsidies to food farmers (who in sub-Saharan Africa are in majority female), affect 
women more than men; in addition, cuts in educational budgets do not help to reduce the school 
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enrolment gap between boys and girls, as studies on the effects of Structural Adjustment 
Programmes in Africa, Latin-America and Asia have shown (see, for example, Diane Elson, 
1998). 
Yet, this is not the main gender bias of the shift of the burden of excessive risk in global 
finance. Apart from a shift of the burden to states, there is a parallel shift of the burden of 
excessive risk to the non-monetized sector of the economy, or the care economy, which mainly 
functions on the basis of female unpaid labour. States, in North and South, and through states the 
taxpayer and receiver of public services is one sector of the economy to which excessive risk 
burdens are shifted, burdens that have been quantified above as lying between 4 and 9 percent of 
GDP. The care economy is another sector that incurs the costs of balancing financial instability, 
although in non-monetised terms. UNDP (1995) has quantified the market value of labour in the 
care economy around 50% of GDP, the majority of which is female labour. Lack of research on 
the relations between the monetised (real and financial) and non-monetised economy makes it 
impossible to make a reasonable estimation of the costs from financial market cycles shifted to 
female unpaid labour. An increasing number of case studies however, point out that increases in 
women’s unpaid labour time are significant in periods of crisis in the developing world (Caroline 
Moser, 1989; Isabella Bakker, 1994; Pamela Sparr, 1994; Diane Elson, 1995; UNDP, 1995). In 
fact, the burden of shifting excessive risks from financial markets to the care economy might be 
captured in two ways. 
First, production in the care economy can act as substitute production for public services 
that have either been cut or have been made too expensive by governments seeking ways to 
reduce their budget deficit through cost recovery measures (Diane Elson, 1998). This substitution 
effect prevents that the effect of a financial crisis on the real economy leads to an unacceptable 
fall in wellbeing at the household level. The types of public services that are substituted by 
female unpaid labour in times of crisis are health care (home care of the sick rather than 
hospitalisation); home made medicine rather than market bought medicine; a reduction in doctor 
visits), education (children are used for household labour rather than send to school), and public 
utilities (electricity is substituted for firewood, kerosine, or cow dung, whereas clean drinking 
water is substituted for unhygienic sources of water). This substitution of public services for 
services in the care economy helps the government to reduce its fiscal deficit and enables 
households to continue consumption, although at lower quality levels, without increasing 
monetary expenditure.  
Second, production in the care economy can act as a substitute for production for the 
market. This can be analysed as savings but can also be regarded as production, albeit non-
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monetized. The motivation is then not to save on household expenditures, but to reduce risks 
attached to production for the global market. Particularly in developing countries, exports are 
vulnerable for world market price instability, since most developing countries have a relatively 
homogenous export package. Moreover, in the agricultural sector, export crop varieties tend to be 
more vulnerable to climatic circumstances and crop diseases than indigenous crops. Hence, in a 
situation of economic crisis, and given the risk averseness of the poor who have no social security 
ensured by the state, it is rational for female producers to shift part of market production back to 
subsistence production, or at least to production for local markets rather than for the high-risk 
world market. Moreover, even when women, like female farmers in sub-Saharan Africa, are 
prepared to take the risk on world market production, they are unlikely to do so because of gender 
distortions. This is because women face another risk that prevents them to benefit from 
production for the global market, which is a lack of control over the receipts of such production in 
the household (World Bank 1999). 
 
7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
The emphasis of this chapter has been on demonstrating, with results from empirical research in 
feminist macroeconomics, that gender is endogenous to the economic process, and that inequality 
in gender relations often has a negative effect on economic (and economic policy) outcomes. 
What is important to emphasize here, is that gender is not only a micro-level variable, but also an 
important macro-level variable and perspective. Just like, for example, inequality as measured by 
the Gini-coefficient is a macro variable featuring in some growth equation, the gender wage gap 
is a macro variable explaining growth differences between labour-intensive export economies on 
the one hand, and capital intensive or less export oriented economies on the other hand. 
As a recapitulation, let me briefly sketch the main theoretical paths through which these 
gendered economic processes occur. A first mechanism is through a gendered response to 
uncertainty. Whereas a liquidity preference is generally seen as the major household response to 
uncertainty, such as unemployment, a substitution of market demand for consumer goods by self-
production through unpaid work is often overlooked as another response. When this response is 
combined with the additional worker effect, often through additional hours of female labour 
supplied, these responses may actually aggravate a crisis, by reducing aggregate demand and 
increasing unemployment. A second mechanism is through the interconnectedness of aggregate 
supply and demand in the household, through the multiple roles that household members play, 
differentiated through the gender division of labour: consumer, paid worker, unpaid worker, 
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entrepreneur, saver, investor, tax payer, and receiver of public services. This may result, for 
example, in different propensities to consume and save for men and women, even at the same 
level of income. In turn, such gendered economic roles in the household may also lead to 
gendered patterns of expectations, which may result in different levels if risk-taking by men and 
women, and possible shifting of risks from males to females in the shape of additional paid and 
unpaid female labour time during downturns. A third mechanism is through asymmetric 
institutions, which work out differently for men and women, or even benefit the one group to the 
disadvantage of the other group. This mechanism runs largely parallel to that of class, with the 
important addition that gendered institutions not only differentiate between households but also 
within households. If for wage earners, the propensity to consume is higher than for capital 
earners (and the proportion of imported goods lower), a well known implication may be that 
economic stimulus packages would be more effective by stimulating wage income rather than 
capital income. In analogy, aggregate demand may be stimulated more effectively by expanding 
employment for women and/or increasing women’s wages relative to men’s wages. 
In conclusion, gender has clear economic dimensions, affecting economic variables, 
decisions, constraints, opportunities, and outcomes. Therefore, treating gender as only an impact 
variable relevant from a social perspective – are women affected differently, and perhaps more 
negatively, than men by a particular economic policy? – is an important question but a far too 
limited way to treat gender in economics. Good economic analysis also includes questions on 
how social inequalities, such as gender,  affect micro and macro economic behaviour, variables, 
relationships and policy effectiveness. New economic thinking can only emerge when it builds on 
inclusive economic thinking, which implies a far deeper understanding of how gender affects 
economic processes. This requires a move well beyond neoclassical economics into pluralist and 
contextualized economic analysis. This chapter ahs argued that such analysis is not only possible 
at the micro level but even at the macro level, so that positive and negative relationships between 
gender inequalities on the one hand and inefficiency on the other hand are taken into account in 
the study of trade, fiscal and monetary policy, financial crises, and growth strategies. 
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